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This paper attempts to inaestigate the

effe

ctiaeness of the open market operations in

Nigeia adopting

eror corectiotr methodology. The study showeil thnt in

the conduct of defmsizte open market
operations, itflationary expectations, treasury bill rate, income and fscal balances exert significant
influences on thzoolume ofbank reserrses.Thepersistmt ffict offscalbalances on the z.tolume of bank
resenses in the shoft-run shruss tlat consideration of Soaemment actiztities remain important in
dnelopments in tlu fnancial sector. Findings lrom the stuLly reoealed thnt the system adjusts itself to
equilibrium within three quarters in the ment of a shock. The fnding that sales of goztemment
secuities in the secondary market do not exert ffict in the long-run conforms to the Keynesian

an

postulations that monetary policy becomes

less

ffictiae in

the

long-run.

JEL Classification Numbers: E5, E44,ESl,852
Kel,rvords: Open market operations, bank reserves, dynamic open market operations, defensive
open market operations, error correction methodology.

Authors e-mail address: pnomanukwue@cenbank.com; moabeng@cenbank.com

L lntroduction
T\ rior to 1914, the Bank of England was reckoned with as the only central
HUunt that conducted its ironetary policy using the operr market
I operation (OMO) as a tool. From the 1970s, however, most industrial

countries began transiting to the adoption of indirect monetary policy
instruments, with most transiting and developing economies following suit.
Today, OMO has become a fundamental and veritable instrument for the
conduct of monetary policy for virnrally all central banks in the world, owing
largely to widespread financial reforms occasioned by the adoption of
globalised market economy. Indeed, OMO has come to be adjudged as the
most useful and flexible tool for influencing the level of bank reserves with a
*Phebian. N. Omanukwue and Magnus. O. Abeng are staff of the Research Department of the Central
Bank ofNigeia. The oians erpressed in this ptper are stictly those of the authors and do not in any wny
represent that of tlu Management of the Central Bank ofNigeria. The authors acknudedge the comments
and. su ggestions{rom anonymou s redaners.
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the desired macroeconomic objectives of the country

In Nigeria, the maintenance of a stable financial system devoid of

sharp
changes in interest rates and other liquidity conditions has been identified ai
one of the most challenging functions ofthe central bank. The Bank has over
the years, adopted several strategies and policies depending on the existing
financial infrastructure to achieve this objective. For instance, before lg93,th;
direct or administrative strategy ofcredit and interest rate ceilings was adopted
in the conduct of monetary policy, but in 1993, the Bank transited to the
indirect method of monetary policy management with open market operations
(OMO) as the primary instrument, complemented by other instruments. This
paradigm shift was informed by the concern about the liquidity overhang
which had been evident in the plethora of monetary management policiei
adopted by the Central Bank ofNigeria (CBN), over the years,iimed mainly at
"mopoing up" excess liquidity from the system. This, no doubt, raises
questions about the efficacy of liquidity management tools in Nigeria,
particularly since the adoption of indirect monetary approach in lune tOO:,
using the open market operations (OMO), as aprimary instrument.

InNigeria, apart from Bogunjoko (1997), who undertook an empirical study

using the cointegration error correction model on the monetary dimension of
the Nigerian economic crises, most literature on monetary policy have
concentrated on broad issues related to the development and- effriacy of
monetary policy/money supply, its evolution and growth. Moreover, most
studies in this area were conducted prior to the introduction of the structural
adjustment programme, (SAP)'. This study, thus, is a pioneering effort in this
regard and is intended to fiIl this gap.

Specifically, the objective of this paper is to examine whether open market
operations in Nigeria has been effective in the achievement of its primary

lNohoithstanding,
study

useful and instructiae inferences were glmned
from these studies in the course of this
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objective of managing fluctuations in the banking system liquidityr. Thus, the
success of OMO must be assessed based on how well this objective has been
achieved. Unlike other studies that examine the efficacy of monetary policy
using the trend approach, this paper takes a step further by estimating an
empirical model, using the error correction technique. The essence of this is to
situate empirically those short and long-run factors that impact directly on
liquidity in the banking system, aside from open market operations. The use of
quarterly datasets for this analysis comes as an additional innovation. The rest
of the paper is organized thus: Section 2 examines some conceptual issues in
the literafure. Section 3 presents an overview ofthe open market operations in
Nigeria. Section 4 appraises the open market operations with a preliminary
trend analysis. Section 5 discuses the data, methodology and model
specification. Section 6 analyses the results of the model and section 7
concludes the paper.

II.

Literature Review

Conceptual Issues
There are two variants of monetary policy instruments, the direct and indirect,
the adoption of any of which is largely determined by the level of development
of the financial market. The direct instruments are quantitative controls, and
are characterized by the setting of monetary targets by the monetary authority
and requesting the financial operators to work towards achieving them. The
predominant policy tools applied under the direct control are the regulation of
interest rate, imposition ofcredit ceilings and sectoral allocation ofcredit. The
commonly cited rationale for the application of this approach is the underdeveloped nature of the financial markets coupled with the scarcify ofcapital
that brings about a sub-optimal pattern ofresource allocation in the economy'

This approach dominated monetary management in Nigeria for over two
decadei. The indirect instruments, on the other hand, thrive in a market-based
economy or well-developed financial market' They seek to influence bank
,Managing
cettral bank

precondition for attaining other obiectioes of a
ltuctuations in the bank reseraes sen)es as s
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reserves, interest rates and money supply through the use of monetary policy
tools like the open market operation; discount rate (the rate at which the central
bank lends to banks as a lender of last resort); and the reserve ratio (a
proportion of deposit liabilities of banks required to be kept with the central
bank). This is based on the belief that the interaction in the market between

these variables will influence both the volume and direction
availability and allocation.

of

credit

Conceptually, open market operations (OMO) has been broadly defined as the
purchase or sale ofqualified debVfinancial instruments by the central bank, in
either the primary market (open market-type operations) or the secondary
ma-rket_(full-fledged open market operations) (Alexander, et al. 1995; Ojo,
l_992). T\e term, "open market" connotes that the monetary authority can not
decide ahead oftime, and on its own, which discount house to conducibusiness
with on a specific day. Thus, it is not a decision from the treasury or the
monetary authority; rather the choice emerges from the ,.open market,' by
which the various securities dealers compete on a price or volume basis
(Obaigbona, 2003). Instruments commonly used for this purpose include
government securities, treasury bills, central bank bills, prime commercial
paper and,/or bankers' acceptances. However, the type ofsecurities traded and
overall market transactions would usually depend on the existence of a welldeveloped and efficient financial infrastructure/market, stability and
competitiveness of financial institutions, number and types of policy
instruments available to the central bank, sustained confidenci on the finincial
sector, the central bank's control ofthe operating variable (e.g. monetary base,
interest rate), existence of technical capacity, real time information on money
market conditions, and a sophisticated Iegal and regulatory framework (Iyoha,
1995; Nnanna, 2003). In most underdeveloped and developing economies,
where the financial system is lacking in depth, the emphasis is uiually on the
primary market, where regular auctions are held and the net amount traded is
varied to achieve the desired objective ofmonetary policy.

In terms of classification, there are three broad variants of the open market
operations. The outright (permanent), self-reversing (temporary/repurchase)
transactions and reverse repurchase agreements. outright transaitions are
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used to absorb or inject reserves over relatively long periods. Seltreversing
(temporary transactions) are adopted over relatively short periods for making
temporary additions to the level of bank reserves, through the purchase of
securities from dealers who agree to repurchase them at a later date and a
specified price. Reverse repurchase agreements implies that a contract for
simultaneous pwchase/sale of securities from participating dealers, are used to
absorb temporary excess bank reserves (Oduyemi, 1993; Ojo, 1992;
Obaigbona, 2003 ; Nnanna, 2003).

In most central banks, OMO is devoted to making small adjustments in credit
conditions and interest rates in order to keep the banking system functioning
smoothly. In doing this, they adopt two methods: defensive and dynamic
methods. The technical adjustments in market conditions are often classified
as defensive open market operations. These are operations taken to offset the
effects of other factors influencing bank reserves. In other words, it is
impossible to know the significance of a purchase or a sale without knowing
how other factors are affecting reserves. Thus, the basic purpose is to preserve
the status quo and to keep the present pattem of interest rates and banking
liquidity at optimal levels. In contrast, when the central banks are more
concerned about the pursuit of their broader monetary policies, dynamic open
market operations is conducted. In a non-technical language, dynamic
operations are those operations taken to increase or decrease the volume of
reserves in order to ease or tighten credit. Unlike the defensive OMO, these
operations are designed to shock the "status quo" and, thus, change money and
credit conditions to a level the central banks believe are consistent with their
broad monetarypolicy goals (Federal Reserve Bank ofRichmond, 1998).

Through the OMO, monetary authorities directly alter the level of cash
reserves of the banking system with the objective of meeting the bank reserve
targets, while indirectly influencing the short-term interest rates, (money
market rates, inter-baxk rates) which, ceteris paribus, should adjust the
availability of credit and money supply in the direction desired by the
monetary authorities, (Mordi, forthcoming). Hence, the purchases (sales) of
OMO securities increase (reduces) the reserves in the domestic banking
system, thus, altering the cost and availability of loanable funds.
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Theoretical Framework
Monetary policy is a key element of macroeconomic policy and its effective
conduct is critical to the achievement of the broader macroeconomic policy
objectives. While economists are in unison as to the primacy of achieving the
broad macroeconomic objectives, the factors influencing economic stability as
well as the modalities for attaining these goals have been subjects of an
unending debate. At the helm of the controversial debate are the Monetarists
and the Keynesians, who hold opposing views with respect to the role of
money in influencing activities in the economy. While to the Monetarists,
"only money maffers", the Keynesians hypothesized that ,.money does not
matter". In a nutshell, the kernel of the disagreement is over the most
appropriate way of managing aggregate demand in order to moderate
economic and social instability.
According to the monetarists, the economy is always stable and disequilibrium
is predominantly induced by changes and growth ofmonetary aggr-gates. To
them, inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon. The moniiariits, thus,
argue that a change in money supply eventually affects expenditure and
domestic output directly and that instability is produced dominantly by the
operation of the govemment sector. They also argue that the privaie sictor
(businesses and households) is insulated from growth in money supply and
cannot be responsible for the instability in the economy as according to
Brunner (1998) the sector is "essentially a stock-absorbing, stabilizingind
self-adjusting process". The monetarists further argue thai the govemment
sector, through its interference with the nominal adjustment mechanisms in the
private sector, causes variability in the economy. In this regard, the monetarists
do not favour deficit financing (a fiscal tool) as u m"uns of stimulating
economic growth. Instead, they recommend that the central bank's monetar!
action through the open market operation involving the sale/purchase of
securities with the public, would accomplish the same purpose i.e. effect a
change in money supply without getting involved in thi piocess of budget
deficits or surplus (Oke, 2003).
The Keynesians, however, rebuffed the postulations of the monetarists and
argue that "money does not matter" and describes fiscal policy as the more

Omanukwue and Abeng An Empirical Investigation on the Effectiveness

of

Open Nlarket

Operations

39

potent tool in the process of maintaining economic stability than monetary
policy. Keynesians refute monetarist arguments that changes in output are
solely caused by changes in money stock, instead they believe that investment
level is the overriding determinant of economic booms and bursts. To the
Keymesians, money stock and aggregate expenditure are indirectly related
through the influence ofinterest rate, thus, interest rate and what happens in the
financial market become critical factors in the transmission mechanism.
Hence, their submission that the real sector cannot be completely insulated as
positedby the monetarist.

The theoretical framework for the conduct of open market operations is
premised on the central bank's core mandate to efficiently maintain price
stability, promote economic growth and sustain a virile balance of payments
position. Currently, these three-pronged macroeconomic objectives are being
rationalized to a single objective of inflation stability in some countries, which
according to Iljas (1998) is "free from any policy trade-off; strengthens the
implementation of monetary policy; increases transparency, accountability
and independence of monetary policy; more realistic in a deregulated and
globalized economic and financial system; and easier to determine the right
instruments"

.

In today's complex and dynamic economic environment, the achievement of
monetary policy goals is far from trivial and, thus, requires a delicate policy
balance and mix. For the reason that some of these objectives are not mutually
exclusive, harmony amongst conflicting goals is achieved through trade-offs
in the formulation and implementation process of monetary policy. The
successful implementation of monetary policy requires the existence of welltrained economic technocrats, efficient utilization of resources and a deep
financial system. There are complex webs or chain of events that link a
monetary policy change with the subsequent changes in other sectors, some of
which take quite a while to completely unfold. Indeed, every monetary policy
effect has a lagged impact between when the policy is adopted and when the
impulse is actuatly transmitted to affect the macroeconomy. Due to the
differing views in determining exactly the process of how policy impulses are
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transmitted in the economy3, policymakers, therefore, set policy targets,
closely monitor their effect and then fine-tune such policies until the
bercJived
distortions are eliminated and the desired goal achieved. It, therefore, becomes
compelling for monetary policy to be forward-looking via the most effective

transmission channel.

A major interest is the transmission process of an oMo transaction, which
proceeds first through the monetary base, in particular the reserves balances of
commercial banks, thereby influcncing their credit-creating ability (campbell,
1982; Minsky and Okin, 1963; Berg et al, 2000). An open marlet purchase
increases the monetary base and money supply, while an op.n .urk"t ,u1..
exerts a contra effect on the monetary base and money supply. In otherwords, a
direct relationship exists between open market transactions and the monetary
base/money supply in the economy, assuming a stable multiplier. This forms
our a priori expectation. To the extent that the central bank does not have any
control over currency outside banks, it follows that bank reserves balances arl
under the control of the central bank, more so, that the deposit money banks
(DMB0 are statutorily required to keep a certain proportion of their reserves'
with the central bank.
The central bank, thus, controls monetary aggregates, consistent with the
targ€ted. economic growth rate based on the schematic construct depicted in
Tabte ( I ), where monetary aggregates (intermediate targets) are influinced by
reserve. money (operational target), through open market operation
transactions. Thus, monetary policy is conducted bised on the relaiionship
between the immediate (operational), intermediate and ultimatL

targets/objectives.

Analytical Frameworkfor the Conductof OMO
A cursory look at literature informs that the analytical framework for the
conduct ofthe open market operations is rooted in the money supply model and
derives from the relationship between money supply "und^'bu.. ;";;y,
3

.For detailed studies on the transmission mechnnisms ofmonetary poricy,
'For detailed analysis of the functions of reserues, see Olrphaniari
iZOOii .

see llanguta

and lkhide, (2002)
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(Nnanna, 2003). This is best captured with the common expression:

(2)

Bt=Rt+Ct
where

Narrow Money Supply (M1)
Currency in circulation
Demand depositsby the non-bankpublic
BaseMoney
Total Reserves ofBanks (Excess reserves +
required reserves)
Timeperiod

M,
C.

DD.
B.

&
t

Taking reserves and currency in circulation as a proportion of total deposit
liabilities produces an equation with the semblance:

M,:

B, *(1+c,)/ (r,+c,)

(3)

Where m represents (l+c)/ (r,+c,), also, known as the money multiplier, c is
currency- deposit ratio, and r is resewe-deposit ratio.
and r are stable, the central bank can influence Bt by ensuring that AB, and
AM,2 are in tandem. If the ex-post Bt is estimated to grow beyond the desired

Ifc

target, the central bank may swing into action by selling govemment debt
securities through the open market operations. The converse would apply ifthe
ex-post Bt is estimated to be lower than the desired target. Indeed, the direct
aim of the OMO is to manage the reserve base ofbanks in a manner consistent
with the achievement of the planned or ex-ante target growth for base money'
Thus the relationship between base money and the money supply can be
sln

Nigenq, this is defned

as

M2 @road money supply), consisting of Ml plus saoings and time deposits
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captured through the equation below:

M.
hence,

Bt

n\B,
M1m,............................................(s)

Recalling that B, : &+C, , it follows, therefrom, that
&+C,
arithmetic tells us that

\o :

Mlrq-C

:

M,irq. Basic

...............(6)

E^q"$,gl 6 defines the optimal demand for reserves by the banking system
(Rto). The supply ofreserve money derived from liabilitiLs side is thusl
B

C,+VC,+RC,

VC, =

Vaultcash

(7)

Where

RC,=
Thus,

&e :

deposit money banks reserves at the CBN and
others remain as previously defined.

VC,+RC, :

B,-C,.........(g)

Equation 8 represents the total reseryes of the bank (\e). The spread
between
the demand and supply of reserves forms the basis and estimates the
need for
the open market operations of the central bank. Thus when
\e > \o, there is an
excess of reserves and central bank engages in the sale of treasury securities
and where &e < &o, the central bank engages in the purchas" of
t .u..,ry
securities.

Certain factors that can affect the effectiveness

of

monetary policy

implementation have, however, been identified in the literature. rn.s"
acto.,
include.the ability of monetary policy instruments to achieve the
targeted
change in monetary and credit aggregates, the size of the money multipliei
and
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expectations on inflation, future income as well as the degree of public
confidence (Zhiyong,2003). In several empirical studies carried out, scholars
have posited that the efficacy of OMO as a tool of liquidity management can be
hindered by unstable macroeconomic conditions, wide variations in monetary
aggregates from the stipulated targets, fiscal indiscipline as reflected by
excessive budgetary expenditures, and technical factors, among others (Ojo,
1992;Iy oha, 1 995 ; Demiralp and Jord6, forthcoming).

Monetary management in Nigeria since 1 993 has been largely dependent on
the OMO as the primary tool, complemented by such other instruments as
reserve requirements, discount window facilities and moral suasion. However,
the quest to determine the effectiveness of monetary policy has extended
current analyses to include such other variables as developments at the
intemational economic and financial markets, capital flows, investments, asset
prices, etc., in addition to monitoring the traditional indicators.
Table

l:

General Framework of Monetary Policy

Instruments

Immed iate target

Intermediate targct

Ultirnatc target

Open Market
Opcrations

tr{onetary Base

Money Supply

Growth

Reservc

Bank Resen'es

Bank Lending

F,mplo]'rnent

(Ml)

/

Inl-lation

Requiremcnts

Discount

Interest Rates

Facilities

(money mar ket)

Interest Rates
deposits

Balance

of

Pa)-rnent s

Iending
Moral Suasion
Source:

Ac\ar

(1998), Bank of lntemational Settleruants policy papers

The result is the emergence of output gap, exchange rate movements and
interest rate differentials as significant variables in the transmission
mechanism process. Among these, interest rate is particularly singled out as an
indicator of monetary policy effectiveness especially with the current wide
range ofbank products and improved payments system. However, Iljas ( 1998)
noted that the "speed of transmission and the magnitude of the pass-tkough of
interest rates depend on market efftciency and the public's expectation of
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future interest rates and inflation". As an effectiveness indicator of monetary
policy, interest rates are now gradually becoming policy target and are also
closely monitored in addition to monetary aggregaiei.

Consequently, a new and more responsive monetary policy framework
(monetary policy rate (MPR)) was adopted in December i006, among other
things to "remove the volatility in inter-bank rates, encourage inti-bank
trading and engender a transaction rate that would improve the trinsmission of
monetary policy actions" (CBN, 2006). The new framework, thus, replaced
the minimum rediscount rate (MRR) as the anchor rate in the economy as well
as repositioned the CBN as the lender oflast resort.

III.

Overview of the Conduct of Open MarketOperations in Nigeria
The open market operations by the cBN are facilitated through its Banking
operations Department (BoD) and the transactions conductld exclusivel!
through the authorized money market dealersu. In Nigeria, there exist two types
of transaction techniques in the market. The first isihe outright or perma'nent
transactions, involving the sale and purchase of govemment iecuriiies, which
are designed to have long-term liquidity impact oiabout 7-90 days. The
second
is the temporary or self-reversing transactions, otherwise calied repurchase
agreements or repos, which are conducted to have short-term liquidity impact
of between l-7 days. The major instrument traded is the short-ierm Nig#*
Treasury Bills with a maturity period of 90 days. The pricing of securiies is
based on the Dutch Auction System (DAS). Iio*"r.., in Juie 2007, with
a
view to further enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the moneymarket
operations, the conduct of oMo transited to a two-way quote platform among
the money market dealers (MMDO on Reuters trading system, though thE
traditional auctions and tenured reverse repos continied on tir. Teirenos
Internet.Banking (TIB). under the two-way quote platform,, the Bank bought
and sold NTBs in the market with a view to moderating the auction rat"es.
Similarly, "the multiple tenors offered ranged from 'i tolsl days and were
structured to synchronize maturity with that in the primary markei, in order
to
enhance the tradability ofthe instruments',(CBN, 2007).
"Hitherto, it uas conducted through the d.iscounthouses
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Daily Conduct ofthe OMOT
Outright transactions
Here, dealers are requested to submit offers to sell or bid to buy securities ofthe
type and maturity that the CBN has selected. The process of the outright
transaction begins by obtaining information and data about money market
activities. The oflice in charge liaises with the money market to gauge the
market situation along with the reserye forecasters in the Monetary Policy
Departrnent of the CBN for the OMO targets'. In the computation of the OMO
target, the Department computes the optimal demand for reserves, determines
the actual level of reserves and determines the surplus or shortage in bank
reserves and, hence, the volume ofsecurities to be traded. Upon receipt of the
computed excess/shortage reserves, the security dealing offrce liaises with the
settlement and control office to determine the volume and tenor of securities
available for sale/purchase. After due consultations with the chief OMO
dealer, notices about offers for sale are then sent to the money market dealers.
Usually, the information to the dealers includes: security being sold; tenor of
securiiy; maturity date and value date oftransaction. An auction process is then
conduited in which the dealers are required to submit bids or offers for sale.
After receiving the bids from the dealers, they are evaluated on a competitive
best-price basii. Based on the bid rates received, the offrce then recommends
the silling rates for the approval of the chief dealer; the Director, Banking
Operations Department. Usually, the bids with the lowest discounts up to the
CbN reserve piice are accepted. On receiving the approval, the OMO result is
prepared and distributed to all stakeholders. The OMO result usually contains
ihe-security type, maturity date, total amount of bids received, range of bid
rates, issui riies, weighted average and the true yield, transactions at the
primary market and transactions in other securities.

Temporary Transactions (REPOS)
Repos are used for temporary additions to bank reserves. With the repos,
,OMO was corulucted on

a weekly basis since 30

lune 1993, but t'rom Nopember 25, 2003, it

corulucted on a daily basis.
,The
targets are thi quantum ofpurchax or sales of
reseme position of the banking system.

xcuities that

has bem

the CBN should. conduct based on thc
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securi-ties are bought from the dealers, who agree

to repurchase them at a
specified date and price. when the repos mature, the idded reserves are
automatically drained. on the other hand, if there is a temporary need to drain

cBN executes reverse repos. These transactions, on the reverse,
constitute an immediate sale of treasury bills to the dealer with a matching
contract for later purchase from the dealer. This repo process begins with tG
receipt of applications from the market operators, aftei which pur:chase or sale
is conducted using specified tenors and approved repo rates. The relevant
entries, such as crediting the operators with the proceeds, are then passed. The
repo process is terminated by debiting the operators with the face value of the
bills and crediting the NTB discounted account with face value ofbiils.
reserves, the

It becomes expedient to note at this stage that transactions involving

repurchase agreements do not exert a direct influence on the money
supplyl
Instead, the direct impact of such transactions is concentrated on-the cash
reserves ofthe banks and the impact on bank cash balances is reversed as
soon
as the repos mature.

IV.

Reviewof OMO in Nigeria

The conduct of OMO
its inceprion in I 993 has largely been
.since ,
contractionary. An overview of oMo activities in Nigeria sholws" mixed
developments. In its first six months of operation, the usJ of oMo was very

successful, induced mainly by high yields (issue rates) on securities, whicir
ranged between 25 per cent and 27.3 per cent. other factors attributed
for its
success were the near collapse of the inter-bank market as well as the foreign
exchange paymexts arrangement at the time, which compelled banks
to bafk
their foreign exchange demand with treasury bills holdings. ny the end of
ihe
year of its inception, the total amount bidded stood at N6L7
biilion compareJ
with a total sale ofN47.2 billion, representing an over subscription of 30'.2 per
cent (See Appendix, Table 1 ).
However, from 1994 - September 1998, oMo remained largery ineffective,
as
government reversed its deregulation policy, with the impoiiti,on
of exchange
rate and interest rate controls, The yield was also administrativery
,"t 7i
between 10-12.9 per cent. Furthermoie, transactions in the foreign
e*crrangl
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market became more profitable, with the introduction of the autonomous
foreign exchange market (AFEM) as funds were diverted to the foreign
exchange market. Thus, in 1995, the total bids and sales declined by 38.1
percent and29.2 percent to N178.8 billion and N158.2 billion,, respectively,
below the level in 1994. However, due to the injection of funds into the system
by the defunct Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), most banks invested in
government securities in 1996 resulting in an increase in OMO activities as
total bids and sales rose to N247.4 billion and N234.8 billion, respectively.
Figure I : Open Market Operations - Bids, Sales and Average Yield
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1997,total bids and sales declined sharply once again by 38.6 per cent and
52.5 per cent to N 151 .8 billion and N I I I '5 billion, respectively, which were
lowei than the levels in all the preceding years, except for 1 993. In 1998, there
was a further sharp reduction in the value of total bids and sales at the OMO
transactions to N59.8 billion and N27.5 billion, respectively. The lackluster
performance in the open market operations was attributed to the unattractive
yi"lds o., the intervention security and in the inter-bank market, paucity of
ItigiUte securities as well as the increased preference for foreign exchange
transactions by banks.
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Activities in the open market, however began to pick up in l999,as aggregate
bids and sales rose ro N181.8 billion and N167.6 biliion, respectrrri-tv.itre
most obvious reason for this astronomical increase in the oMoactivities was
the improved yield. Total bids and sale rose moderately from N 924.6billion
7?1 6 blllion, respectively, at commencement of ihe daily OMO sales in
Tgll
2003 to N I ,l 36 billion and N I ,099 billion in 2004 and N 2,270 billion and N
I ,808 billion in 2006, respectively. In 2007, while bids stood at N 627.4 billion,
sales rose significantly to a record high of N3,736.3 billion. The substantiai
increase in sales at the oMo was attributable t. "the underwriting of the
unsubscribed portion of the bills by the money market dealers (MMDi) in line
with the .opera-tional guidelines for money market dealers in Nigeiia; the
introduction of over-the-counter (OTC) two-way quote trading
[,stem in
govemment securities; and the aggressive liquidity mop-up during the year in
order to meet the reserve money target under the poliiy Suppo.t-tnrtrument
(PSI). others were the market driven rates that prevailed at the two-way quote
trading platform and the additional securities issued at the lg2-day p.irnu.y
auction specifically for liquidity managemenf , (CBN, 2006)
Figure 2: Primary and Secondary Market Rates
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Open Market Operations and Economic Indicators
Given the pfmary objective of oMo as that of influencing the level of
bank
reserves balances before impacting on short-term intereit rates (operating
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target), money supply (intermediate target) and, hence, other macroeconomic
aggregates (ultimate objectives), its effectiveness can be adjudged by its
ability to impact on these variables in the desired direction. In this section, a
preliminary trend analysis of these variables is presented. Two money market
rates, the treasury bills and OMO rates (where available) or OMO sales as
proxy for OMO rates, (where OMO rates are not available) are adopted paripassu with the other economic indicators.

The chart below shows the growth rates of OMO sales, excess reserves and
bank reserves during the review period (1993-2007). While a cursory look
shows that bank reserves moderated throughout the period, the same cannot be
said of excess reserves and OMO sales which witnessed high volatilities.
Nonetheless, stability was witnessed from 2003 when the OMO sessions
migrated from weekly sales to daily sales. The plausible explanation for the
spikes for most of the period could be the exogenous nature ofexcess reserves,
which is determined by several factors, including fiscal operations of
governments that are outside the jurisdiction of the CBN. This largely accounts
for the performance of OMO as a liquidity management tool. Since monetary
and fiscal policies interact in the economy, a firm grip ofone strand of policy
without the other would always result in policy failures. This means that the
success of OMO might have been eroded by the imprudence of the fiscal
authorities.
Figure 3: OMO Sales, Bank and Excess Reserves
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OMO Sales and Excess Reserves
Figure 4a pictorially depicts the trends of excess reserves of DMBs, oMo sales
and the deviation between these two from July 1993 to December 2007. The
figure indicates that prior to December 1997, the spread between oMo sales and
excess reserves seemed to close up, giving rise to a marginal deviation. Excess
reserves, however, rose astronomically in the following year due to a number of
factors among which were increases in receipts rrom Vir, customs and excise
duties, rapid injection of liquidity into the system by rhe activiries of the
Petroleum (special) Trust Fund (prF), federal govemment fiscal operations, the
release ofoutstanding holdings of stabilization iecurities to DMBsjenhanced
oil
receipts by the government, increased pa;,rnent ofJVC cash calls to oil companies
and net inflows of foreign assets. The growth in excess reseryes reflected the
restoration ofpublic confidence in the system following sustained commitment to
financial sector reforms and the moderation in inflatiorirate. However, the impaci
9f _c-BN weekly intervention in the Autonomous Foreign Exchange Maiket
(AFEM) which required authorized dealers to provide 100 percent nairia cover
for
th^eir foreign exchange demand compelled DMBs to rediscount large proportions
of their treasury bill holdings, consequently exerting significant Jontru.tlonay
influence on their reserve positions. other iactors that rioderated the growth iir
excess reserves and accounted fbr the stability recorded in the subsequent years
included the transfer of PTF placement from the DMBs to the 'cBN, the
suspension of the phased release of stabilization securities and the delay in
the
release offederal govemment capital expenditure. However, from 2000,
the trend
was reversed following the expansionary fiscal operations of the three tiers
of
government, the substantial draw-down on federal govemment deposits
with the
CBN, and the monetization of crude oil receipts.
It is, therefore, evident from these experiences that the problem ofexcess liquidity
in the system could not be effectively addressed through the conduct orbuo.
Some of the identified constraints of oMo included ]he paucity
t."J";Li;
securities (even though this. was temporarily remedied at iome "f *lin
tr,"
i"i"t
conversion of treasury bonds to treasury biilsy, the uncompetitive rates
which
stagnated atan average of 12 per cent for most of the period, rapid injections
oi
funds into the system through activities of the defunct prF and gl.,r".n-.nt
operations, repressive interest rate and the increased demand "r". r"*lg.
exchange at theAFEM.
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Figure 4a: Deviations between OMO Sales and Excess Reserves
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Figure 4b: Deviations between OMO Sales and Bank Reserves
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OMO, TB and Prime Lending Rate
A graphical representation of the treasury bill, OMO and prime lending rates is
shown in figure 5 below. A close look would reveal that the rates trended in the
same direction during the review period, with prime lending rates above other
rates formost of the period.

The significant rise in inter-bank rates in 1999 and 2001 is a reflection oftight
liquidity regime in the banking system, the relatively high demand for foreign
exchange at the AFEM and the impact of monetary policy action to reduce the
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injection of official funds, particularly petroleum trust funds into the system.
Nevertheless, the prime lending rate firmed somewhat before declining in
1997.lt subsequently rose steadily, but slowly, until the end of 2002. It
declined thereafter in 2003 and then maintained a gradual downward
movement.
Figure 5: Treasury Bill Rate, OMO Sates and Prime Lending Rates
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Generally, treasury bill rates and OMO rates moved in similitude throughout
the review period except in 2001 where the rates diverged significantly. The
adoption of universal banking system in 2001 greatly altered the portfolio
structure of DMBs coupled with the impact of demand pressure and tight
monetary policy. The upsurge in the demand for foreign exchange compelied
banks to access the market for funds to cover their bids in thi Inter-Bank
Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) as well as the partial funding of the Global
System of Mobile communication (GSM). The decline in rates in the
intervening years reflects mostly the downward adjustments in the minimum
rediscount rates.

Bank reserves moderated during the review period as excess reserves and
OMO sales witnessed high volatilities. Similarly, deviations between excess
reserves and OMO sales moderated even though this stability was, howeveq
rocked from Ye ar 2000.Interaction of the rates in the markei showed that all
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the rates trended in the same direction with the prime lending rate maintaining
an upper band over others throughout the review period. Treasury bills and
OMO rates moved in similitude in the review period.

V.
V.I

Methodology and Model Specification
Methodology

The methodological framework for the analysis follows the money supply
model defined in section 3. The variables were tested for unit roots using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The tests were conducted at I and 5 percent
significance levels. The results of the unit root tests are presented in Table 2.
These tests and their respective order of integration are complemented with
graphical analysis (SeeAppendix Figures 1 and 2). After determining the order
of integration, the long-run models were then derived using the ordinary least
square estimation technique. In order to examine the dynamic relationship
between the exogenous variables and bank reserves, a test of stationarity was
conducted on the residuals ofthe long-run regression model. The residuals of
the series were found to be I(0), that is stationary, confirming that the variables
are co-integrated, thus indicating that a dynamic model could be constructed
incorporating the error correction mechanism, ecm (Table 2).
The Granger causality test is undertaken to establish the link as well as measure

the information content between the past values of OMO sales on bank
reserves and vice versa. This does not connote correlation or causality in the
more common use of the term, but rather provides us with statistically
significant information of past values of OMO sales on the future values of
bank reserve.

Quarterly data on bank reserves, treasury bills rate, fiscal balances, open
market operations sales and inflation expectations, for the period 1993-2007
were used. This defines the scope and period ofanalysis. For ease ofanalysis,
the study categorized open market operations sales into quarterly sessions.
This is done to ensure uniformity of all data sets, albeit OMO sessions were
conducted on weekly basis from 1993-2003, and thereafter, on daily sessions.
Data for this study were sourced from the CBN Statistical Bulletin, Annual
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Report (several years) and the OMO database from the Banking Operations
Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria. In all cases, "d" is the first
difference operator, "ecm" is the residual estimated from the long-run static
model. Nominal values were transformed into natural log and lower case
letters represent the log series while variables preceded with a ,.g', are groMh
rates.

VJ

ModelSpecification

Following from literature, the equation below is specified and estimated.
Equation (1) specifies bank reserves (br) as a function of omo sales'(omo),
fiscal balances (fid); income proxied by gross domestic product (gdp),
inflation expectations (infe) and treasury bill rates (tbr) (used is a measure-of
market operations in the primary market). In the Nigerian case, the use of data
on oMO sales is adopted given its availability. Movement in bank reserves are
apriori negatively related to OMO sales. It is expected that as income
increases, people tend to deposit their nominal income increases in the banks.
Developments in the fiscal sector and primary market for securities also
influence bank reserves. Inflation is assumed to follow a backward pattern.
This equation captures the defensive open market operations, which mirrors

br = cro - oromo -crrfid +crrgdp -croinfe -crrtbr

VI.

(l)

EmpiricalResult,AnalysisandMajorFindings

Granger Causality Test
The causality test results are reported below
Table 1: Result from the Granger Causality Test

Obs

Null Hlpothesis

F-Steristic

Probabilil

LBR dnes not Granger Cause I.ON{C)

1.627

0.195

LOMO does not Grangcr Cause LBR

2.834

o.M1\

"Signifcant at 5 per cent
'This study adoPts tfu oMO

sales as a rneasure

offionetary policy interaention

due to

aaailabilily of data on the series
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The null hypothesis is that the quantum of bank reserves does not granger
cause sales of govemment securities in the open market operations in the initial
regression and vice versa in the second regression. From the test results above,
the key issue that emerges is that changes in OMO sales are preceded by
changes in the quantum ofbank reserves. We cannot reject the hypothesis that
bank reserve does not Granger cause sales of govemment securities in the open
market operations, but we do reject the hypothesis that OMO sales does not
Granger cause bank (excess) reserves. Therefore, Granger causality runs oneway from OMO sales to bank reserve. This test corroborates the framework for
the conduct ofopen market operations.
Results from the empirical model

Model variables that were not statistically significant were scientifically
eliminated using the various information criteria and diagnostic tests from the
model results such as p-values, redundancy and omitted variables tests. Table
2 below shows the order of integration of the transformed variables and the
error correction term employed in the model.
Table

2:

Unit Root tests for transformed variables and regression residuals
7n I-vel of
Nuisance
Order of

Variable

A.DF test statistics

integration

F actor

eignificaoce

Lomo

-3.671

r(0)

TC

5

I-br

-3.869

r(0)

T(l

5

Tbr

-6.141

r0)

C

1

G6d

-8.301

r(0)

c

1

Infc

-4.318

I(0)

C

1

L"gdp

-5.698

r0)

TC

I

ecm (-1)

-4.185

1(0)

TC

1

Note: C=intercept, TC: trmd and intercept, N: No constant or linear trend

Long-run model results (Table 3) from the estimated equation, which
ex;ines the defensive open market operations, show that only changes in
nominal income and primary market rate significantly influence the volume

of
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bank reserves. In accordance with apriori expectations, a percentage point
increase in nominal income increases bank reserves by 0.5s
iercentale point.
This implies that bank reserves increase by 0.5 5 percentage point for eiery one
percentage point increase in people's nominal income. primary markei rate,
proxied by the treasury bills rate, was significant in affecting the quantum oi
bank reserves. It is expected that increases in treasury bills rate and hence its
attractiveness should be sufficient to lure investors into the primary market,
leading to a reduction in bank reserves. [t, however, fell short of tfie apriori
expectations as it was wrongly signed. Fiscal balances, though rightly signed,
exerted an insignificant impact on volume of bank reserves. 1le sa-ie or
govemment securities in the open market operation and inflation expectations
did not meet any ofthe apriori expectations.
Table 3

Long-run Static Model
Dependent Variable: LBR
Method: kast Squares
Sample(adf usted) : 1993:2 2007 :2
Included observadons: 57 aftet adjus ting endpoints
Variable

LOMO
GFID
LNGDP
INFE
TBR
R-squared
Adjusted R -squared
S.E.

of

regression
Sum squared resid

likelihood

Coefficient
0.079120
-0.0s4660
0.553810
0.006732
0.030990
0.585582

0.553704
0.402431
8.421450
-26.37982

Std.

Error

o.0?6489
0.055846
0.0s6218
0.007601
0.009357

t-statistic

Prob.

1.034386

0.3057
0.3322
0.0000

-0.978767
9.851 18(r

0.885748

3.312145

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Durbin -Watson stat

0.3798
0.0017
4.674651
0.602393
1 .101046
1.280261

1.067914
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Table 4

Short-run Dynamic Model
Dependent Variable: LBR
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted) : 1994:1 20O7 :2
Included observations: 54 after adiusting endpoints

V*t"St.
c
r3R(-1)
LOMO(-3)
GFID
GFrD(-1)
DLNGDP(-3)
INFE(-l)
DTBR
ECM(-1)

C".m.U,

SU

0.192769 0.51393s 0.375084 0.7094
0.885453 0.153455 5.770122 0'0000
0.095302 0.068716 1.386913 0.1723
-0.080400 0.040369 -7.991614 0.0s25
-0.083697 0.039203 -2.134971 0.0382
-1.129939 0.s32135 -2.123409 0.0393
-0.011629 0.005780 -2.012094 0.0502
-0.027274 0.01327-/ -2.054301 0'0458
-0.491867 0.767949 -2.928669 0.0053
4.722870

0.796363 Mean dependent var
0.760161 S.D. dependen t var
0.284890 Akaike info criterion
3.652311 Schwarzcriterion
-3.894838 F-statistic
1.843601 Prob -stat1s0c

R squared
Adjusted R -squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
t-og likelihood
Durbin -\Tatson stat

0.58172s
0.477587
0.809084
27.99765
0.000000

Table 5

Further Diagnostic Tests*
Sitial
LBR

* Seial conelation

Correlati.rn

0.149

0.955

0;704'/
test was pey'brmed

White Heteroskedascity

Arch LM

with tfu Brertsch-Godfrey

P-oalues of the P-statistics of the indiuidual test.

IM

test. Reported oalues are the
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Fig 6: Actual, Fitted, Residual Graph: Defensive Open Market Operations
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Figure 7: Normality Test for Residuals
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Median

6

-4.23E-16
0.001900
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{.570E04
Std. Dev.

4

Kurt06is

2
0

{.6

.0.4

4.2

0.0

o.2

0.4

0_6

0.262510
0.'l4t 673
3.384597

Jarqu6'Bere

0.513449

ProbeUlity

0.77 3581

0.8

The. short-run model presented in Table 4 above revealed that past
varues

of

bank reserves, fiscal balances, nominal income, inflation expectations
and
treasury bills rate exerted significant effect on the quantum of'bank
reserves.
ofthe significant variables in the short-run, fiscal barances, treasury bills rate
and inflationary expectations met aprtori expectations. Fiscar
balances in the
contemporaneous and first quarter lag reduce bank reserves by 0.0g percentage
points, each. The combined effect is a reduction in bank
i.."*". by 0.i;
percentage points. This implies that fiscal operations
in the form of a deficit
would usually impact on money market opirations as lending UV
Ount, io
government reduces the vorume ofbank reserves. Inflationury
.ip..t tiorr. oi
economic agents from the first quarter lag exert a minimal
0.01 ;it .h;;t; i;
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bank reserves. Contrary to the long-run results, nominal income did not meet
apriori expectations, even though it was significant in explaining changes in
bank reserve. In the short-run, the treasury bills rate conforms to aprioi
expectations as it impacts negatively on the quanntm ofbank reserves. A one
percentage rise in treasury bills rate reduces bank reserves by 0.02 percentage
points as investors shift their financial portfolio to the primary market. The
minimal effect of this rate could be as a result of the paucity of a wide-range of
primary market instruments. The finding that OMO sales did not meel apriori

expectations could be that market participants do not find the rates as
sufficiently attractive to invest and, perhaps, because of the use of
complementary instruments such as the minimum rediscount rate (now
monetary policy rate) and cash reserve requirement which may indicate a
trade-off with activities in the open market. The model statistics are quite
plausible and robust. The coefficient of determination indicated by the Rsquare indicates that about 80 percent of variations in bank reserves are
explained within the model. The overall regression is significant indicating a
good fit for the model. The error corection term indicates that the model
adjusts to equilibrium within three quarters, with 49 percent of shocks
corrected in each quarter. Further diagnostics show the absence of serial
correlation, while the tests for heteroskedascity both forARCH and LM are not
rejected. The Jarque-Bera test ofnormality does not reject the null hypothesis.

V.[I
.

Findings, Recommendations and theway Forward

The study showed that in the conduct of a defensive open market
operation, sales in the open market did not influence variations in bank
reserves in the right direction and was insignificant in the long-run and shortrun, perhaps, due to the complementary approach of liquidity management'
This remains an area for further study.

.

It was revealed that in the short-run, the effects of past values of bank
reserves and fiscal operations largely influenced changes in bank reserves.
Empirical results from the study also highlighted that income remains an
important factor in determining the volume of bank reserves, exerting a 0.55
peicentage rise in bank reserves, followed closely by fiscal operations and
developments in the primary market.
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The persistent effect offiscal balances on the volume ofbank reserves in

the long and short run shows that consideration of the activities in the
government sectorremain important for financial sector development.

.

The finding that the open market sales did not conform to apriori
expectations may result from the market participants not finding the rates
attractive enough to invest compared with the more convenient, and-rewarding
standing deposit rates ofthe cBN. perhaps this explains the huge patronage oT
the hitherto deposit window facility by money market ope.atori which-saw
them eaming interest on balances with the central bank and the subsequent
elimination ofthis standing deposit facility serving as a disincentive for banks.
Prior to the introduction ofthe new monetary p olicy rateto in 2 006, marketrates
were tied to the movement in the flow of funds, and such policies like the
withdrawal ofpublic funds from the DMBs and the sharing of the Federation
Account by the three tiers of govemment often drive rates to unmanageable
proportion. Those spikes caused distortions and rendered pla-nning
cumbersome. This volatility also affected activities in government securitiei
market as interest rate crashes affected prices, driving inflation up, thus
the CBN to engage in liquidity mop-up exercisei, sometimes ai very
Tul.ing
high costs. The new policy is a welcome development and should be sustained
as it offers the monetary authorities with an- additional tool for effective
monetary management.

.

There is also the need to broaden and deepen the money market
activities
the economy. In this regard, the policy shift that expanded the
-in
number of market dealers/participants to 20 ( I 7-Banks and 3 Discount Houses)
in 2006 from the hitherto 5 dealers is commendable. This would further
develop a vibrant, active and liquid market for government bonds market in
Nigeria. Prior to this, the DMBs engaged in sJcurities trading through the
discount houses and in the_process paying interest on this brid[ing n r"ctron.
The newpolicy does not only broaden the scope of operations in t'heirarket
but
-of
also enables a level playing ground for ali players. This transpa."r.y,
'oTlu old Minimum Redismunt Rate which was supposed to be the nominar anchor rate
had
inflectiae at impartiag changes in other money market iates

beetr

r
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competition and engenders a healthy and robust money market
l improved technology, quality services and other advantages of marketen activities. In addition, though the rediscount facilities at the discount
w' dow were open to both the DMBs and discount houses, the rates were
di ;criminatory against the DMBs. The rates for rediscounting by the DMBs
wcre higher than those for the discount houses which again imposed additional
costs o; the banks. The new poticy has redressed this, adding impetus and
reduced cost to the activities in the market.
rse, breeds

.

The paucity of market instruments should be tackled holistically' The
conversion of bonds to securities only provides temporary succour to the
thorny issue. Given the cost and economic implications involved in the
issuance of CBN Bills, the government could give an undertaking to the CBN
to float more instruments of various tenors or use its own instruments (bills
with more than 14 days tenor) for the purpose of structural liquidity
management and thereafter transfer the cost to the treasury to manage'
Govemment's recent strategy of converting short-term bills to longer term
maturities should be sustained as this does not only reduce debt service cost but
also promotes long term investment.

.

The current system of a 2-way quote system using the Reuters in Lagos
is a huge step in the right direction. Indeed, it has eliminated the physical
presentation of making and acceptance ofoffers and, hence, optimizes the cost
and time of transactions. Nevertheless, a further enhancement of these IT
driven technologies that will also extend to other segments of the market
should be encouraged.

.

As a further step towards the deepening of the market, there is an

.

The fiscal dominance prevalent in the Nigerian economy is underscored

immediate need to deveiop the derivatives market. This market has grown to be
a major driver of most iconomy's development processes and holds huge
potentials for the Nigerian economy. However, adequate understanding of the
Lperationalities of this market cannot be overemphasized in order to forestall
potential financial crises, reminiscent of theAsian crisis of thel 990s'
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and mirrored by the high and volatile swings often recorded in the inter-bank
call rate which usually rise astronomicaly in the week preceding the
Federation Accounts Allocation committee (raec; meeting'but dip io the
lowest ebb after the disbursement of the monthly allocation t-o all the tiers
of
govemment. As a corrective measure, the cBN should consider the
conduct of
repo in the week preceding the meeting and reverse repos in the following
week, with a view to moderating the rate in the market. this would certainl!
ameliorate the distortionary impact and shocks often associated with the
fiscal
activities of government.

Appendix
Table

l;

Open Market Operations (OMO) Weekly Session*
in N billion, (except otherwise stated)
Amount Sold

Bidded
1993

61.69

1994

289.02

223.6a

1995

178.71

'|

1996

247.39

234.a4

Averagc

Avcmge Yield

tario

Tenor (days)

(%)

43.1

26.O

(o/o)

47.21
76.63
'77.39

58.r 9

88.49
94.93

199'l

151-84

111-53

1998

59.U

27.45

1999

181.78

167.60

2000

442.60

318.10

2001

403.30

346.94

2002

656.36

591.99

2003

924.56

794.65

2004

1136.14

1099.45

xloS

1247.32

9a9.U

2U)6

2270.20

'1808.42

2Ut"7

627.42

"OMO

Sales/Bids

?3.45
45.a7
92.20
65.91

41.2

12.9

47.6

12.6

43.8

12.2

37.6

10.1

28.O

12.t

3s.8

17.6

4.7

15.2
17.0

95.94
90.19
85.95
96.7?

3736.30

79.36
79.66
595.50

44.7

18.8

32.4

14.1

34.0

13.5

44.65

7.O

135.0

8.6

82.9

6.7

sessions were cond ucted on weekly basis
from 1993-2003, and thereafier, on d.aily sessions.
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Conclusion

The open market operations have largely achieved its objective ofcontaining
liquidity surfeit. For example, it was instrumental to the country meeting the
Policy Support Instrument, (PSI) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The pressure from favorable oil prices coupled with the build-up of excess
crude oil eamings could not have been contained if open market sales were
afforded the monetary authorities the
retained at weekly auctions.
opporhrnity to determine what the market needed and the ability to offer long
and short term instruments to meet the various mahrrity obligations.

It

The operators in the sector need to be empowered to take advantage of the
dynamism of the market, hence, the need for intensiffing capacity building in
the money market segment. Now that the country is contemplating transiting to
Inflation Targeting, the institution of a dlT ramic and robust money market is a
necessary prerequisite for the success of achieving price stability -low
inflation rate.
Figure I : Time Plots of Variables in their levels
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Figure 2:
Time Plots ofvariables at First Difference (except otherwise inferred from table2)
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